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I analyze empirically the eﬀects of both urban and industrial agglomeration on men’s and
women’s search behavior and on the eﬃciency of matching. The analysis is based on the Italian
Labor Force Survey micro-data, which covers 520 randomly drawn Local Labor Market Areas
(66 per cent of the total) over the four quarters of 2002. I compute transition probabilities
from non-employment to employment by jointly estimating the probability of searching and the
probability of ﬁnding a job conditional on having searched, and I test whether these are aﬀected
by urbanization, industry localization, labor pooling and family network quality. In general, the
main results indicate that urbanization and labor pooling raise job seekers’ chances of ﬁnding
employment (conditional on having searched), while industry localization and family network
quality increase only men’s. Moreover, neither urban nor industrial agglomeration aﬀect non-
employed individuals’ search behavior; although men with thicker family networks search more
intensively.
∗Bank of Italy and University of Oxford. E-mail address: sabrina.diaddario@bancaditalia.it. This work owes
much to extensive discussions with Eliana Viviano. I am particularly grateful for her invaluable help with the
attrition analysis and with some aspects of programming. I also thank Erich Battistin, Massimo Caruso, William
Greene, Vernon Henderson, Barbara Petrongolo, Alfonso Rosolia, Margaret Stevens, and William Strange for their
helpful comments and suggestions. Finally, I thank both the participants to the CEPR conference ”Integration and
Technological Change: Challenges for European Regions” (11-13 June 2004, Paris) and those of the Labor Economics
seminar held at the University of Oxford on 2nd December, 2004. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
author and do not involve the responsibility of the Bank.1 Introduction
Matching models are widely used to analyze the process of job formation in the presence of labor
market frictions. These models are typically taken to operate, and empirically estimated, at the
national level (see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey). In a context of slow mobility
of labor, however, the matching of workers and jobs may occur instead at a much more localized
level (e.g., at the local labor market level), and in particular, it may be aﬀected by the degree
of urban or industrial agglomeration. Local markets, for instance, may diﬀer in the presence of
skill heterogeneities: according to Marshall’s ”labor pooling hypothesis”, agglomeration lowers the
degree of mismatch between the skills required by ﬁrms and those oﬀered by workers, improving the
quality of the match. Also, denser markets may be characterized by a lower degree of information
imperfection. Finally, congestion depends on population and ﬁrm density, which may vary to a
great extent across local markets.
The majority of the literature analyzes labor market dynamics by focusing on the unconditional
hazard rate into employment. However, since the latter is the product of the probability of searching
and the probability of ﬁnding a job conditional on having searched, it is interesting to explore the
extent to which transitions to employment are due to the eﬀort individuals devote to job seeking
or to the employment chances per unit of search.1 Moreover, these two stages of the search process
can be diﬀerently aﬀected by agglomeration externalities: local hazard rates through changes in
the overall labor demand and supply, and in the technology of matching; job seekers’ propensity to
search through individual resources, search costs and returns, and hazard rates.
In this paper I empirically analyze the impact of agglomeration on both the individual’s search
intensity and the hazard rate into employment. The sign of the ﬁnal outcome of agglomeration
eﬀects is not a priori obvious. Indeed, on the cost side, on the one hand more agglomerated areas
may be characterized by lower search intensity because of higher search costs due to congestion (e.g.,
traﬃc jams). On the other hand, a shorter distance to job interviews, more frequent ”face-to-face
contacts”, and the presence of thicker informal networks lowering information asymmetries may
reduce both commuting and information-gathering costs, which increase the individual intensity of
search. Another factor on the cost side that may increase search intensity in the more agglomerated
areas, is the higher cost of living (e.g., housing costs), as it raises the opportunity cost of staying
unemployed. On the return side, agglomeration may increase job seekers’ search intensity by
raising local wages or improving hazard rates. The latter, in turn, depend on the intensity of job
1 Peracchi and Viviano (2004) are one of the few exceptions in the literature exploiting this relationship.
1advertising, the thickness of the labor market, and the technology of matching. While there is some
empirical evidence of higher wages in agglomerated areas, the net eﬀect of agglomeration on labor
market tightness and on the technology of matching is less clear-cut. Indeed, agglomeration may
raise both the demand and the supply of labor, so that it is not obvious whether it would make
markets more or less tight. With regards to the technology of matching, whether the size of the
market improves or depresses the contact rate (per unit of search), depends on whether congestion
eﬀects dominate over ”thick” markets externalities (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Finally,
also the eﬀect on match quality is uncertain: on the one hand, the pooling of specialized labor
improves the eﬃciency of matches; on the other hand, knowing that in agglomerated areas the
probability of a meeting is higher, job seekers may become choosier, which lowers the probability of
job oﬀer acceptance. Which of these eﬀects will prevail is thus a matter of empirical investigation.
In this paper I use the Italian Labor Force Survey micro-data to estimate the eﬀects of agglom-
eration on employment probabilities and job search intensity. First, to measure the eﬀects of urban
agglomeration I use a dummy for ”large city”, equal to one if the individual resides in a local labor
market system (LLM) with a population above 404,526 inhabitants. In contrast to the majority
of the studies that use arbitrary cut-oﬀ points, I adopt the same threshold value devised by Di
Addario and Patacchini (2005) on the basis of spatial autocorrelation analysis applied to Italian
LLMs. However, since the spatial unit of analysis is crucial to determine the existence and extent
of agglomeration externalities (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2004), I also use a continuous variable:
the LLM population size.2 Second, to measure the eﬀects of industrial agglomeration I use both a
”super-district” dummy (denoting the LLMs with a high presence of small and medium sized man-
ufacturing ﬁrms) and a traditional-sector-specialization index, proxying the eﬀect of labor pooling.
Third, I use the number of employed individuals in the household as a proxy for network quality
(see Wahba and Zenou, 2003), under the assumption that family networks are important to ﬁnd
employment and that employed individuals have access to larger networks than unemployed ones
(as they presumably have more information on job oﬀers). In particular, I divide the Italian terri-
tory into three sets of LLMs: large cities, small towns containing super-districts, and non-industrial
small towns. I am thus able to compare the labor market dynamics of non-employed people living
in urban and industrially agglomerated areas to those living in the rest of the country. This method
enables me to compare the urbanization and industry localization eﬀects on search behavior and
2 According to Rosenthal and Strange (2004) the size of the area may matter, as externalities decay quickly over
space (within 10 miles). However, the logarithm of LLM area is rarely signiﬁcant in my regressions. While in theory
both population size and density may generate agglomeration externalities on search behavior, in practise this does
not seem to be the case in Italy and in the UK (for the latter, see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2004).
2employment probabilities, which, to my knowledge, has not been analyzed before.
Overall, my results indicate that urbanization increases mens’ chances of ﬁnding employment
below the 2,400,000-inhabitant threshold, while the positive externalities generated by localization
appear only beyond a certain threshold (e.g., in the industrial clusters with a higher share of
small manufacturing ﬁrms). In contrast, women’s employment chances always increase with labor
market size but are not aﬀected by industrial agglomeration. Living in a more skill-homogenous
labor market, however, increases the probability of ﬁnding a job for both men and women. As to
search intensity, job seekers’ behavior is not aﬀected by either urban nor industrial agglomeration.
Finally, having a larger family network increases men’s chances of employment but also their search
eﬀort.
These ﬁndings suggest that the externalities generated by agglomeration on search behavior
and employment probabilities vary according to individuals’ gender, and to both the type and the
degree of agglomeration considered. This has important policy implications.
First, one of the reasons why agglomeration externalities have gender-speciﬁc eﬀects on labor
markets dynamics may depend on the absence of policies aimed at supporting mothers’ employment
during child care. This, on the one hand, may contribute to the persistence of the traditional
division of labor in the household, making men and women face diﬀerent opportunity search costs;
on the other hand it could favor job discrimination against women.3
Second, if the spatial concentration of small and medium sized industrial ﬁrms improves the
eﬃciency of matching, it might be advisable to favor the emergence or the development of industrial
clusters.4 However, my results indicate that not all industrial districts reduce frictions, as the
probability of ﬁnding a job per unit of search is signiﬁcantly higher in super-districts but not in
industrial districts. While the super-districts subset has been identiﬁed out of industrial districts on
the basis of statistical criteria (namely, ﬁrm size and sector concentration), it would be important
to study more in detail whether they also diﬀer along other lines (e.g., product quality, organization
of the production process, etc.). Furthermore, it might be useful to investigate more in detail why
super-districts improve only the matching of men.
Third, the absence of urbanization eﬀects on men’s hazard rates beyond the 2,400,000-inhabitant
3 Some evidence of wage discrimination in Italy is reported in de Blasio and Di Addario (2005), who also show that,
after controlling for observable individual characteristics, women have a lower probability of becoming entrepreneurs
than men.
4 Although this is a controversial issue. Since the 1990s, Italy provides subsidies to promote and sustain industrial
districts, but according to some authors (e.g., Putnam, 1993) the genesis of Italian industrial districts has been a
slow process, with roots in historical events that took place centuries ago, and thus cannot be fostered by any policy.
3threshold might imply that the cities above it (i.e., Rome, Milan and Naples) are ”too big”, possi-
bly because of decreasing returns in the local matching function. According to Au and Henderson
(2004), however, being ”too small” is worst than being ”too big”: the loss of real output per worker
generated by under-sized cities is much larger than that originating from oversize (−16 percent
against −6 percent). Knowing which is the optimal size of Italian cities would be important, as
increasing the dimension of under-sized cities (for a given industrial composition) generates more
productivity gains than reducing that of over-sized ones.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework; Sec-
tion 3 reports the empirical model, Section 4 the data set and the variables; Section 5 discusses the
estimation results; and Section 6 concludes.
2 The theoretical framework
In the standard search and matching literature (for instance, Pissarides, 2000), the number of
matches M is expressed as an increasing and concave function of the amount of workers searching
for employment and the number of vacant positions. To study the eﬀects of agglomeration on search,
I assume that the national labor market is geographically segmented. Thus, every geographical unit
or local labor market j has a matching function speciﬁc to the area, both in terms of arguments
(as in Patacchini and Zenou, 2003) and in terms of technology:
Mj = Mj(sjJj,ajVj) (1)
where Jj is the number of searchers in local labor market j, sj the area’s average search intensity,
Vj the amount of vacancies, and aj the area’s intensity of job advertising.





where hj is the rate of matching per unit of search,5 and θj = Vj/sjJj is a measure of the area’s
labor market tightness.
5 That is, the rate at which a worker searching with unit intensity will ﬁnd a job, if sij is normalized to be between
0 and 1. Under this normalization, in the empirical part of the paper (Section 4) I take sij to be the probability
of searching and hj to be the hazard rate (i.e., the probability of ﬁnding a job conditional on having searched).
Note that the individual’s job-ﬁnding-rate can be expressed as a function of labor market tightness only under the
assumption of constant returns to scale of the matching function.
4Let a job seeker’s budget constraint be:




ij,γ > 1 (4)
where b denotes the income of a non-employed person, Cj(sij) the cost of search, zij a real
consumption good bundle, and cj the area cost of living (e.g. housing costs). I assume that
agents’ utility from consumption u(zij) is an increasing and concave function of zij. The expected











ij is her expected lifetime utility when currently employed and r the discount rate.
The optimal level of search intensity s∗
ij a job seeker will exercise is that which maximizes (5):
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Job seekers are thus faced with a trade-oﬀ between the marginal cost of increased search eﬀort
in terms of current consumption and the marginal increase in their chances of ﬁnding a job that it
induces. Thus, whether search is more or less intense in agglomerated areas depends on whether
labor market size lowers the costs of search and/or increases its returns. I take this simple model as
the starting point to discuss the mechanisms through which agglomeration may aﬀect individuals’
search behavior.
2.1 The eﬀects of agglomeration
On the cost side, there are two channels through which agglomeration may aﬀect search: search
costs and the cost of living.
With respect to the former, a shorter distance to job interviews or more frequent face-to-face
contacts due to physical proximity may reduce both transportation costs and the costs of acquisition
of information on vacancies.6 In denser areas, search costs may be lower also because of the presence
6 From the ﬁrm’s perspective, in Wheeler (2001) per-worker ﬁrm recruitment costs decrease with population
density, as the frequency of interactions enhances the arrival rate of potential workers for a job opening, which has a
ﬁxed cost.
5of thicker informal networks facilitating the diﬀusion of information on job opportunities (Wahba
and Zenou, 2003). In contrast, congestion (e.g., more intense traﬃc jams, crowded buses, etc.)
may, on the contrary, increase search costs and thus reduce individuals’ search intensity.
With regards to the cost of living, more congested areas are likely to suﬀer from higher house
prices and rents, which, by increasing the cost of staying unemployed with respect to lower-density
areas, should induce job seekers to search more intensively. This eﬀect occurs whenever the unem-
ployment beneﬁt b is either ﬁxed or less responsive to the local cost of living cj than local nominal
wages; in fact, there is evidence that wages are actually higher in denser areas, and b will include
some nationally determined beneﬁts that are not indexed for local cost-of-living.
On the return side (the hazard rate), there are four main channels through which agglomeration
may aﬀect search: wages, vacancy advertisement, labor market tightness, and the technology of
matching.
First, job seekers may search more intensively in agglomerated areas because they have a higher
utility from employment than elsewhere. Indeed, according to the literature on agglomeration, in
larger labor markets wages may be higher than average because of the productivity gains generated
by the Marshallian externalities.7 However, a higher expectation of future earnings has also the
indirect eﬀect of increasing reservation wages, which lowers the job seeker’s acceptance probability
and thus the hazard rate and the intensity of search.
Second, if agglomeration increased labor market tightness it would also raise hazard rates and
thus individuals’ search intensity. However, whether markets are more or less tight in agglomerated
areas is itself a question of empirical investigation, as there are reasons to expect the number of
both applications and vacancies to be higher than in non-agglomerated zones.8 Again, the positive
direct impact of tighter labor markets on hazard rates could be partly oﬀset by an increase in
reservation wages, lowering unemployed workers’ job acceptance probabilities (though the other
side of the coin is that ﬁrms become less choosey about whom they hire as their diﬃculties in ﬁlling
vacancies raise).
7 For empirical results on higher urban wages see, for instance, Glaeser and Mare’ (2001) for the US and Di
Addario and Patacchini (2005) for Italy, though de Blasio and Di Addario (2005) do not ﬁnd evidence of diﬀerent
average earnings in Italian industrially agglomerated areas (Industrial Districts).
8 According to Helsley’s and Strange’s (1990) model, the competition externality that ﬁrms generate when locate
in a city (due to the fact that other ﬁrms’ proﬁts are reduced) prevails on the productivity externality (due to the
fact that the productivity of all workers is enhanced). Under free entry, this leads to ”too many” ﬁrms in cities,
which implies, other things being equal, a higher vacancy-to-unemployment ratio. Since there are no reliable data
on vacancies in Italy, I cannot empirically test the existence of diﬀerentials in local labor market tightness due to
agglomeration. These can only be inferred from the impact of urbanization and localization on individual hazard
rates, which are increasing in market tightness and can be measured directly (see Section 5).
6Third, agglomeration may increase job seekers’ propensity to search by intensifying ﬁrms’ job
advertising. Also this channel operates through an improvement of the hazard rate. The impact
of agglomeration on the intensity of job advertising is twofold. On the one hand, if more agglom-
erated areas were characterized by tighter labor markets they would also exhibit less intense job
advertising, since in this case a lower chance of ﬁlling their vacancies would discourage ﬁrms from
advertising their positions (a sort of ”discouraged-job” eﬀect). On the other hand, denser areas
may be characterized by more intense job advertising for mainly three reasons. Firstly, because
the existence of thicker networks9 may reduce the cost incurred by ﬁrms in advertising their vacant
positions. Secondly, because the higher number of job seekers may allow employers to more easily
cover any ﬁxed costs of advertisement. Thirdly, because of a greater average labor productivity.10
In all these cases, job seekers exercise more eﬀort simply because they have better chances to ﬁnd
a job and are hence more encouraged to search than elsewhere.11
Finally, search intensity depends on the technology of matching. Agglomeration may have an
impact both on the chances and on the quality of matching.12 With respect to the former, on the
one hand the greater concentration and / or specialization of matching agents in agglomerated areas
may increase the eﬀective job contact rate, and thus the hazard rate. On the other hand, a higher
density may actually lower the meeting rate if congestion eﬀects dominate over ”thick” markets
externalities.13 Furthermore, even when the contact rate (per unit of search) is improved job seekers
may react by becoming choosier and accepting job oﬀers less frequently, thereby depressing the
hazard rate. Which type of external (dis)economy will prevail is, ultimately, a matter of empirical
investigation.
With respect to the quality of matches, according to Marshall’s ”labor pooling hypothesis”
agglomeration improves the matching eﬃciency between jobs and workers, as the areas where
many specialized ﬁrms concentrate tend to attract the job seekers with the speciﬁc skills required
9 These can either be informal (e.g., Marshall’s ”industrial atmosphere”) or real network agencies (Arzaghi and
Henderson, 2004).
10 See Pissarides (2000) for a partial equilibrium analysis of job advertising and Ciccone and Hall (1996) – among
others – for the evidence on higher labor productivity in denser areas.
11 As Pissarides (2000) notices, this is the reverse of the discouraged-worker eﬀect.
12 See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a survey. Note that agglomeration may also aﬀect the elasticities of the
matching function with respect to job seekers and vacancies, so as to generate increasing returns to scale. As a
matter of fact, the majority of the empirical studies (see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a review) ﬁnds constant
returns to scale in the aggregate matching function, possibly because reservation wages adjust to oﬀset the scale
eﬀects generated in the contact technology or in the productivity of job matches (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2004).
13 See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). Besides the negative externality generated by a job seeker on the other,
other sources of congestion may derive from local ”dis-amenities” such as more traﬃc jams, crowded subways, pollution
etc. For a survey on agglomeration externalities see Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Duranton and Puga (2004).
7(for a survey, see Duranton and Puga (2004) and Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Thus, on the one
hand the better expected quality of matches may raise the job seekers’ probability of acceptance as
ﬁrms make more attractive oﬀers, but on the other hand agents’ choosiness (i.e., reservation wages)
may again increase, which would go in the opposite direction.14
In conclusion, it is certainly very diﬃcult to predict the sign of the net agglomeration eﬀect
on hazard rates and search intensity, as the equilibrium generating them is very complex. The
aim of this section was really the highlighting of some of the possible mechanisms at work and the
introduction of a note of cautiousness in the interpretation of the results.
3 The empirical model
As I showed in the previous section (equation (6)), the transition probabilities from non-employment
into employment depend on two elements, one determined by agents’ search behavior and the other
one by the matching process. In order to empirically examine the impact of agglomeration on the
transition probabilities between labor market states, thus, one needs to ﬁnd measures of both the
individual’s propensity to search and of the eﬀectiveness of matching.
I shall deﬁne sit as the probability that a non-employed person looks for a job at time t,15 and
hit as the probability that she ﬁnds employment at time t+1, conditional on having searched. Each
person who was not employed at time t can be in one of the possible three states at time t + 1 :
1. they sought employment between t and t + 1 and found a job (Et+1);
2. they sought employment between t and t + 1 but did not ﬁnd a job (Ut+1);
3. they did not seek employment between t and t + 1 (Ot+1).
Let ˜ sit be the latent variable determining whether a non-employed person looks for a job at time
t (i.e., the diﬀerence in her expected utility from searching and not searching) and ˜ hit the variable
determining whether a job seeker ﬁnds employment at time t+1 (incorporating both the likelihood
of her meeting a prospective employer and the sign of the surplus generated by that match). Even
14 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2004) suggest that when agglomeration improves the quality of matches and the
mean of the wage oﬀer distribution increases, job seekers raise their reservation wages so as to oﬀset any positive
eﬀect on hazard rates. Conversely, when agglomeration raises the arrival rate of job oﬀers (for instance, through a
higher vacancy-to-unemployment ratio), hazard rates tend to increase while individual wages do not.
15 Note that in the theoretical model presented in Section 2, sit was a continuous variable greater of equal to zero
denoting the number of search units supplied by the individual i. Here, without loss of generality, I am normalizing
search intensity to be between zero and one.
8though ˜ hit and ˜ sit are not observable, I can express them as a function of two non-coincident sets
of individual and location-speciﬁc variables, Xit and Zit (detailed in Section 5), using the Labor
Force Survey micro-data on labor market transitions:16
˜ hit = β0Xit + 1t (7)
and
˜ sit = γ0Zit + 2t (8)
The probability of observing a person who has searched at time t is thus Pr(γ0Zit+2t > 0| Zit),
which I assume to be a probit Φ(γ0Zit). Similarly, the probability of observing a job seeker ﬁnding
a job at t + 1 is Pr(β0Xit + 1t > 0| Xit) = Φ(β0Xit).
My econometric methodology will consist in the joint estimation of sit and hit by maximum
likelihood. To ensure robustness, two alternative econometric speciﬁcations will be estimated.
I ﬁrst consider a simple search model where (after controlling for observable characteristics)
individuals can be treated as identical, in the sense of being randomly matched to vacancies. In
this framework, the transition probability from non-employment into employment is the product
of the probability of searching sit and the probability hit that a job seeker ﬁnds a job. Thus, I will











[1 − Φ(γ0Zi)] (9)
If there was unobservable heterogeneity among workers, however, the probabilities of searching
and ﬁnding a job (conditional on the Xi and Zi’s) would not be independent. I therefore correct the
above maximum-likelihood estimation to take into account the fact that the hazard-rate equation
can be estimated only on the censored sample of the agents who search (Zitγ +εi2 > 0). To do so I
adopt the method proposed by van de Ven and van Praag (1981) for bivariate probit models with
sample selection. In this case, the likelihood function is:
16 Even though in the estimations I allow for location-speciﬁc eﬀects, in this exposition I take the geographic area
indexes j as implicit in the individual characteristics of agent i.
17 A large part of the empirical literature on hazard functions (see Devine and Kiefer (1991) for a review) assumes
that the error terms are distributed according to a logistic function. I adopt here a normal distribution to be consistent
with the second econometric model (see below). In any case, I also tested all the speciﬁcations reported in Section 5










[1 − Φ(γ0Zi)] (10)
where Φ2 is the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution of the joint probability of sit and
hit, and ρ is the correlation between the error terms. This method corrects the bias that arises from
using (9) when the error terms in equations (7) and (8) contain some common omitted variable.
The results of the two estimation methods are reported in Section 5.
4 The data
4.1 The data set
For the empirical estimation I use the Labor Force Survey (LFS), conducted in the year 2002
by the Italian National Statistical Oﬃce (Istat). This survey is the main source of information
on individuals’ working condition, unemployment and job search behavior, in addition to their
personal characteristics.
The survey is conducted quarterly in two stages: about 1,300 municipalities are sampled at the
ﬁrst stage, and about 70,000 households at the second one. The LFS follows a rotating scheme
according to which each family is interviewed for two successive rounds, and then again for two
other consecutive waves after two quarters of interruption, for a total of four times. So, theoretically
50 per cent of the sample is kept constant between two consecutive rounds. The LFS has a natural
longitudinal dimension with people followed up to ﬁfteen months, but the linkage of individual
records across surveys can be problematic, because of the lack of a personal identiﬁer and because
of reporting errors in the household code.
Istat currently provides yearly longitudinal ﬁles linked with a stochastic matching algorithm,
but these ﬁles do not contain information about individuals’ place of residence and cannot be used
to study the eﬀects of agglomeration on labor market dynamics. In this paper, I reconstructed
the longitudinal quarterly transitions with a deterministic method linking individuals’ records on
the basis of the family identiﬁer and some time-invariant information (i.e., the date of birth and
sex; see the Appendix for further details), which enables me to recover 75 percent of the potential
longitudinal sample. The loss of the remaining observations could be a potential source of bias for
my estimates in case it was not randomly distributed. Even though it cannot be known whether
theses losses are due to random reporting errors in the key variables or to the non-random exit of
some individuals from the LFS (”attrition”), I can test the hypothesis of random loss of information.
10In the Appendix I describe the methodology adopted and report the test results, which conﬁrm the
validity of my deterministic matching procedure for constructing an appropriate panel dataset for
the analysis of labor market dynamics.
4.2 The agglomeration variables
In this paper most agglomeration variables are deﬁned at the ”local labor market” (LLM) level.
LLMs are clusters of municipalities aggregated on the basis of the residents’ daily commuting
ﬂows to their place of work.18 LLMs are relatively self-contained, in that, by deﬁnition, they oﬀer
employment to at least 75 per cent of their residing workers, both with respect to the total number
of workers in the area and with respect to the total number of residents. Exhaustive partitions of
the territory based on worker commuting have been devised in many OECD countries,19 since they
reﬂect local labor market conditions better than administrative areas do. The literature on matching
is increasingly basing the empirical analysis on LLMs, in order to avoid a geographical aggregation
bias in contexts of imperfect labor mobility. The geographical reach of agglomeration externalities is
itself at the center of the literature debate, and may depend on the speciﬁc phenomenon analyzed.20
In this respect, the characteristic of self-containment makes LLMs particularly suited to be my
spatial unit of analysis, since it enhances, by construction, the likelihood that a job seeker searches
within the boundaries of the labor market where he resides.
Various measures of agglomeration, both urban and industrial, are examined.
Urbanization is measured with the LLM population size.21 Since the absolute level of population
increases very gradually across LLMs, with the largest variations occurring only at the upper end of
the distribution, I also use a ”large city” dummy to test whether agglomeration economies manifest
themselves only beyond a certain threshold value. Nevertheless, the choice of a threshold deﬁning a
large city is not a straight-forward issue; it should not be arbitrary and should plausibly be country-
speciﬁc.22 Thus, this paper adopts the threshold level of 404,526 inhabitants devised by Di Addario
18 The ﬂows are obtained from the 1991 Population Census data. I assigned each LFS observation to a LLM with
an Istat’s algorithm matching LLMs to municipalities.
19 The UK, for instance, has been divided into 308 ”Travel-To-Work Areas” (OECD, 2002).
20 See Arzaghi and Henderson (2004) for a discussion on this issue and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a
review of matching studies based on LLMs.
21 I also tested the joint eﬀect of logarithm of LLM population size and logarithm of LLM area, but the latter was
never signiﬁcant. Also Petrongolo and Pissarides (2004) make a case for using the UK’s Travel-To-Work Areas size
rather than their density, in contrast with the earlier literature (e.g., Ciccone and Hall (1996) or Coles and Smith,
1996), stating that density was more important than population or employment size in generating externalities.
22 The Italian population, for instance, is much more dispersed over the territory than the US one, suggesting the
use of diﬀerent threshold values in the two countries.
11and Patacchini (2005) on the basis of spatial autocorrelation analysis applied on Italian LLMs.23
The intuition behind this methodology is that in order for a LLM to be classiﬁed as a large city, its
population: 1) must be above the national average, and 2) must not be randomly distributed (i.e.,
it must show a signiﬁcantly positive or negative correlation with that of the neighboring LLMs).
In order to further check the sensitivity of the results to the speciﬁc threshold adopted, I also run
the same regressions on the sub-sample excluding the three largest LLMs (those with a population
above 2,400,000 inhabitants).24
Industry localization is measured by two variables: the Cannari’s and Signorini’s (2000) ”super-
district” dummy and the traditional-sector-specialization Pavitt index. Super-districts are the
”industrial district” subset with a higher incidence of LLM small-ﬁrm manufacturing employment.
Industrial districts, in turn, are identiﬁed by an Istat algorithm associating each LLM a dummy
variable equal to one if the area shows both a dominant sectoral specialization and a higher-
than-average share of small and medium enterprises and manufacturing employment.25 The LLM
traditional-sector-specialization Pavitt index is taken as a proxy of labor pooling / industrial-district
agglomeration, since the latter are characterized by a high specialization in traditional sectors. This
variable should enable me to assess the eﬀect of localization through an improvement of the quality
of matches rather than through an increase of their quantity, since labor pooling reduces the degree
of mismatch between the skills required by the ﬁrms and those oﬀered by the workers, raising the
eﬃciency of the match.
Last, the only measure of agglomeration that is not based on LLMs is the number of employed
household members, that I take as a proxy of network quality.26 The idea is that family networks
are important to ﬁnd employment and that employed individuals have access to better quality
networks than unemployed ones (as they presumably have more information on job oﬀers). The
validity of this variable relies on the absence of unobserved characteristics (such as ability) shared
among family members.
23 More speciﬁcally, the authors use the Moran Scatterplot in conjunction to the Local Spatial Autocorrelation
Statistics.
24 That is, the LLMs containing Rome, Milan and Naples, the three largest municipalities in the Center, North,
and South of the country. The population of the remaining LLMs is below 1,500,000 inhabitants.
25 See de Blasio and Di Addario (2005) for a more detailed explanation of how industrial districts are identiﬁed by
Istat and Cannari and Signorini (2000) for a description of the methodology used to single out super-districts. Note
that I also tested the eﬀect of the industrial district dummy, but do not report the results here as this variable was
never signiﬁcant.
26 Similarly to Wahba and Zenou (2003), who use the number of family members who are in the labor force.
124.3 A ”natural” experiment
The LLM characteristic of self-containment together with a very limited mobility of labor, make
Italy a sort of ”natural” experiment for analyzing agglomeration eﬀects, as under these conditions
LLMs can conceivably be considered as separated markets and the urbanization and localization
variables as exogenous. If, on the contrary, the latter were endogenous (e.g., because correlated
to some omitted unobservable variable), the agglomeration eﬀects on hazard rates and search
intensity would not be correctly detected. For instance, if it were the case that the most able
job seekers moved to the largest cities,27 the urbanization eﬀect on hazard rates would be biased
upwards (provided that the probability of ﬁnding a job increased with city size and that ability
could be observed by the employer before forming the match). In contrast, if the more generous
government support or the presence of a stronger informal labor market in the largest cities attracted
particularly the less able or lazier people, the urbanization coeﬃcients on hazards would be biased
downwards.
Nevertheless, the risk that either the most or the least able people move to the most agglom-
erated areas is little in Italy, since labor mobility is, in general, particularly low. Indeed, even
the unemployed job seekers, who are generally the most likely to migrate (Dohmne, 2005), are
unwilling to move out of their town of residence to ﬁnd a job. As Table 1 shows, up to 80 percent
of the unemployed Italians are ready to accept a job only in their LLM of residence, and more than
41 percent just in their own municipality.28 The table also indicates that only 1.7 percent of the
non-employed individuals in working age interviewed in the four 2002 waves were absent from their
household of residence at the time of the interview, and just one-ﬁfth of those who had been away
for more than a year (a merely 1.2 percent of the total) was looking for a job. Mobility is low also
amongst the employed individuals: the share of those who work in a province diﬀerent from the
one of their residence is less than 7 percent (Table 1).
Labor mobility has been decreasing over time, especially with respect to long-distance move-
ments (Cannari, Nucci and Sestito, 2000): between 1960s and 1990s the share of inter-town changes
of residence in total population fell from 0.3 to 0.2 percent. The authors show that a large part
of this reduction is explained by a house price increase over the period in the areas with better
27 In a context where people have a preference for urban consumption amenities this phenomenon could occur
because the most able individuals, who can command higher wages, might be better capable to aﬀord the big cities’
higher cost of living. Although in Italy urban wage diﬀerentials may not be large enough to attract workers to large
cities: wage premia are 2 − 3 percent large in nominal terms (Di Addario and Patacchini, 2005), much less than in
the US (33 percent; Glaeser and Mare’, 2001).
28 In each LLM there are, on average, 10.3 municipalities.
13employment perspectives relatively to the rest of the country (namely, the North versus the South).
The rigidities in the housing market can certainly discourage geographic mobility.
First of all, the presence of rent controls down-sizes the private rented sector, rationing rents
and increasing workers’ moving costs. The degree of imperfection of the Italian rental market is
apparent from the ﬁgures on the distribution of rent contract types. In 2000, the share of non-
liberalized rents was still surprisingly low: only 16 percent of rent contracts were in derogation from
the rent-control law,29 35 percent of households were still under controlled rents (’equo canone’ law),
up to a quarter of contracts were informal, more than 16 per cent regarded council housing, and
almost 5 per cent were subsidized (Di Addario, 2002).
Secondly, the large transaction costs for buying and selling a house further increase migration
costs and discourage owner-occupiers from becoming renters when relative price change,30 thus
increasing the bias towards owner-occupation. The share of owner-occupying households is indeed
rather high in Italy (about 70 percent of total), which further hampers mobility (see Henley, 1998).31
As a matter of fact, homeowners have a lower propensity to move than renters (after controlling
for individual characteristics; Di Addario, 2002).32 The propensity to change house is generally low
even within the same city: ﬁgures from the 2000 Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and
Wealth indicate that only 7 percent of households are planning to change house in the next two
years.33
Finally, the sub-optimal size of the market rented sector together with the high transaction
costs for buying and selling a house may also bias people’s choices towards commuting rather than
changing residence. However, this would not raise endogeneity issues in my agglomeration variables,
since they are deﬁned on the basis of LLMs, which are self-contained precisely in terms of workers’
daily commuting ﬂows.
29 Before 1992 the ’equo canone’ law put ceilings on rents. Afterwards rents were liberalized for new contracts, in
derogation from the rent-control law (L.359/1992).
30 In Italy tenure choices may be less responsive to prices than in the US, where the housing market is characterized
by a high residential mobility across States.
31 Note that according to Dohmen (2005): 1) high homeownership rates lead to greater unemployment, and
2) migration is more sensitive to wage than to unemployment diﬀerentials. Indeed, after controlling for individual
characteristics, the probability of owner-occupying is higher in the South of Italy (Di Addario, 2002), where migration
rates are low in spite of the presence of higher unemployment rates than in the North (see Table 3). Also in line with
Dohmen’s (2005) theory, in Italy wage diﬀerentials over the territory are rather small in size.
32 The author also shows that immigrants are less likely to buy the house of residence, conﬁrming a bigger diﬃculty
or reluctance to settle in a province diﬀerent from one’s own.
33 The data does not enable me to tell whether people intend to change house within or across LLMs, but since
the most frequently reported motivation for moving is the purchase of a house, I presume that the majority of the
expected moves would be within the same municipality.
144.4 The sample
In 2002 LFS surveyed 777,248 individuals. In order to analyze transition probabilities I restricted
the sample to the people who were surveyed for at least two consecutive waves. Since my analysis
concerns the labor market dynamics of non-employed persons, I also excluded those already em-
ployed at time t, and those either below the age of 15 or above that of 64. After excluding those
for whom there were missing observations on the relevant variables, the data set comprises 71,286
non-employed individuals.
In Italy there are 784 LLMs. LLM population size, density and area vary greatly. The mean
population size is 73,424 inhabitants, ranging from 2,901 in Limone sul Garda to 3,311,431 in
Rome. Density ranges from a minimum of 10 inhabitants per square Kms. (Crodo) to a maximum
of 3,250 (Naples), with a mean of 184.6. Finally, the mean of the LLM area distribution is 384
square Kms. ranging from 10.4 (Capri) to 3,539 (Rome). Nineteen of the 784 LLMs have a
population above the 404,526 inhabitant threshold and 99 are classiﬁed as super-districts (199 as
industrial districts).
My sample includes 520 LLMs (66 percent of the total), and comprises an average of 137 indi-
viduals per LLM. Since the LFS survey is stratiﬁed to represent Italian regions and municipalities,
all the 19 large cities are always sampled (for a total of 20,335 observations).34 Furthermore, even
though the LFS was not designed to represent the super-district population, the sample distribution
reﬂects that found at the national level: the percentage of LLMs classiﬁed as super-districts is 12.6
in Italy and 13.5 in my sample (for a total of 5,285 individuals in 70 super-districts).
5 Empirical analysis
I now turn to the empirical estimation of the determinants of individual search intensities and
hazard rates, examining in particular whether these probabilities diﬀer between agglomerated and
non-agglomerated areas. The estimations were conducted separately for men and women and,
unsurprisingly, labor market dynamics turned out to be substantially diﬀerent for the two groups.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the quarterly transition probabilities and ﬂows both at the aggregate level and for
men and women separately. The transition matrix shows that in Italy there is a high unemployment
34 These are (in descending order of population levels): Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin, Bari, Florence, Genoa,
Palermo, Bologna, Catania, Venice, Padua, Desio, Taranto, Verona, Bergamo, Cagliari, Como and Lecce.
15persistence, as 63 percent of the people unemployed in the quarter preceding the interview are still
unemployed in the successive quarter. While these numbers are very similar for men and women,
signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences can be found in other respects. First, in the average probability
of ﬁnding a job, conditional on being non-employed at time t: the transition probability from
unemployment into employment is almost 18 percent for men and only 10 percent for women, and
the respective probabilities of ﬁnding a job for those recorded as inactive at time t are 5 and 3
percent respectively.35 Second, the transition probability from unemployment into inaction, greater
than that into employment for both sexes, is much larger for women than for men (in line with
other empirical results, e.g., Broersma and Van Ours, 1999). Finally, Table 2 shows that the ﬂows
from inactivity to employment as a percentage of the working age population are generally more
substantial than those from unemployment into employment (1.4 versus 0.8 percent; in line with
previous results, e.g., Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). In light of this fact, and consistently with
the most recent literature (Broersma and Van Ours (1999); Brandolini et al., 2004), I shall estimate
hazards from non-employment to employment rather than from unemployment.
The Italian labor market is known to be segmented with respect to territory (see, for instance,
Peracchi and Viviano, 2005). While, traditionally, labor market conditions are analyzed at the
macro-area level (North, Center, and South),36 I examine whether they also diﬀer along the degree
of urban and / or industrial agglomeration. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the year 2002
on the employment, unemployment and activity rates for all the agglomeration units considered
in this paper (large cities, super-districts, and industry-thin small-sized towns). It also shows the
share of job seekers in total non-employed population and the hazard rate into employment. The
former, computed as the ratio between the sum of the employed and unemployed persons at the
time of the interview and the non-employed people who actively searched in the preceding quarter,
can be interpreted as a measure of average search intensity.37 The hazard to employment is the
probability that a job seeker ﬁnds a job between successive quarters, and is computed as the ratio
35 However, when expressed in percentage of the working age population, the ﬂows from inactivity to employment
are larger for women than for men.
36 In 2002, for instance, unemployment rates ranged from 3 percent in the North-East to 14 percent in the South,
while employment rates ranged, respectively, from 64 percent to 50 percent (see Table 3).
37 Note that in this paper the pool of job seekers is larger than the set of the people recorded as unemployed
according to the ILO deﬁnition. In line with a large part of the empirical literature on matching (see Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) for a survey), I assume that each search period (the time interval between t and t + 1) lasts
three months. Thus, to ensure temporal consistency between stock and ﬂow data (transitions to employment) the job
seekers’ pool must comprise all non-employed people, willing to start working immediately, whose last search action
took place in the previous quarter – rather than in the previous month, as it is in the ILO deﬁnition (see Brandolini
et al. (2004), and Peracchi and Viviano (2005) for a discussion).
16between those moving into employment between time t and t + 1 and total job seekers.
In 2002 the unemployment rate ranged from a minimum of 3 percent in super-districts to a
maximum of 10 percent in large cities. Conversely, employment rates were lowest in large cities
and highest in super-districts (55 percent against 65 percent). These patterns are largely conﬁrmed
at the macro-area level, so that they cannot be explained by the fact that most industrial districts
are located in the regions of the Center-North-East of the country.38 With regards to labor market
dynamics, the industrially denser areas show the lowest share of job seekers and the highest hazards
to employment from non-employment (respectively, 11 and 57 percent). In contrast, large cities
show the lowest hazards to employment, probably in large part due to the greater stock of job
seekers concurring for available jobs. These oﬀsetting eﬀects are mostly conﬁrmed in all the Italian
macro-areas.
The descriptive statistics of Table 3 would thus indicate that agglomeration is associated with
speciﬁc labor market dynamics. In particular, these results suggest that search intensity is highest
in large cities and hazard rates are highest in super-districts. The impact of agglomeration, however,
can be better analyzed in a more comprehensive model where the features of the local labor markets
and the characteristics of individuals are taken into account.
5.2 Empirical speciﬁcation
The empirical models proposed in Section 3 can be used for this purpose. In the remainder of
this section, I will ﬁrst examine a baseline model estimating the parameters of the log-likelihood
functions (9) and (10) on the basis of individual and local labor demand characteristics, then test
the existence of agglomeration eﬀects on both hazard rates to employment and search intensity.
The hazard rate to employment depends ﬁrst of all on variables aﬀecting local labor demand
conditions and the individual’s productivity. The former are proxied with three set of indicators.
First, two indexes meant to capture contemporaneous labor demand shocks: the share of employees
working overtime in total workers and the average number of extra-hours worked.39 The coeﬃcients
on these variables should be either signiﬁcantly positive or zero, depending on whether demand
expansion is or is not fully compensated by overtime work increases. In the latter case, a rise
of overtime work would be accompanied by an increase in the number of vacancies, which, other
38 Also, note that within the South the super-district unemployment and employment rates are of a comparable
size (respectively, 3 and 63 percent) to those in the North.
39 I am aware that these indexes are imperfect proxy for demand, as they could also reﬂect supply-side conditions.
Ideally, I should control for vacancies (even though the majority of hazard studies does not; Petrongolo and Pissarides,
2001), but there are no data for Italy.
17things being equal, would improve the hazard rate. In contrast, if all the demand increase was
entirely compensated by overtime work, my indicators should not aﬀect the hazard rate. The
second local labor market variable I consider is the geographical density of job seekers (similarly
to Petrongolo, 2001).40 Since, as shown in Section 2, hazard rates are increasing in local labor
market tightness, I expect job seeker density to have a negative sign. The third set of variables
includes the LLM Pavitt specialization indices.41 In particular, I expect hazard rates to be higher
in the LLMs with a more intense concentration of labor-intensive industries, under the hypothesis
that the areas characterized by a large presence of traditional sectors can be taken as proxies for
industry concentration (see Section 4.2). The personal characteristics that I use to control for
the individual’s productivity are age, age squared, and educational attainment (ﬁrst degree, high
school, compulsory education). I also control for search duration (0–1 month, 1–5 months, 6–11
months), expecting it to be inversely related to the chances of ﬁnding a job. Finally, I control for a
dummy denoting whether the individual had previous work experience, as well as for seasonal and
geographical dummies.
As seen in the theoretical model (equation (6)), an agent’s optimal search intensity sit depends
on the hazard rate hit into employment that he anticipates facing if he searches. In estimating
the equation for search intensity, I therefore include all the individual and labor-market explana-
tory variables used in the hazard-rate equation. In order to proxy for the value (monetary and
other) of non-search activities, which I expect to lower the probability of participation in any given
application round (i.e., search intensity), I also include the individual’s position within the house-
hold (single living alone, household head, and spouse), the self-perceived work status (housewife,
student, or retired),42 and the number of non-working people in the household.43
40 I also used the logarithm of the total labor force and that of the population above the age of 15, with no diﬀerent
results.
41 I computed the Pavitt specialization indexes at the LLM level from the 1996 Industry Census, using data on









where E is employment, j represents the Pavitt sector (i.e., high technology, specialization, scale intensive, and
traditional), and m manufacturing.
42 Since the household decisions are linked by a budget constraint, the position in the household may matter. Note
that the sum of the three self-perceived work status dummies equals to being inactive at time t.
43 Using data at the provincial level from the Consulente Immobiliare, I also controlled for house prices and rents,
but these were never signiﬁcant. I used data for 2002, the oldest year available (1965 for house prices, and 1993 for
rents) and the average of the entire period.
185.3 The results
5.3.1 Baseline model
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the baseline model for men and for women, respectively. To
show the robustness of my results, in each table I report the outcomes of both the econometric
models discussed in Section 3 ((9) and (10)). In spite of the fact that the Wald-test always rejects
the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the error terms, conﬁrming the presence of a selection
bias, the two estimation methods provide the same signs and statistical signiﬁcance levels for almost
all the regressors considered in the hazard rate equation (which is the one subject to the selection
problem).
a) Hazard rates
In the baseline model for men (Table 4), hazard rates are higher in the North-East, for those
with previous work experience, the less educated, and the older population.44 As expected, the
probability of moving from non-employment into employment decreases with search duration (see,
among others, Lancaster, 1979). In particular, individuals who have been searching for less than
one month have a chance of ﬁnding a job twice as large as those who have been searching for more
than one year.45 As expected, higher LLMs’ job seeker density reduces the probability of ﬁnding a
job, probably because of the congestion that unemployed workers create on each other (see Burgess,
1993 or Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), whereas a LLM’s specialization in labor-intensive sectors
increases it. Surprisingly, a higher LLM share of overtime workers in total workers lowers hazard
rates,46 while average extra-hours worked do not have any signiﬁcant impact. In contrast to the
male population, women have a higher chance to ﬁnd a job when they are younger and when they
have a University degree, and a lower chance if they live in the South (Table 4).47
b) Search propensities
For both men and women, search intensity increases with education, age, past work experience,
and with residing in the North-East. In contrast, students, retired workers and housewives search
44 Even though these last two results are in contrast with some empirical studies on the UK (e.g., Lancaster, 1979),
they are in line with previous ﬁndings on Italy (see, for instance, Peracchi and Viviano, 2005).
45 In general, marginal eﬀects have been computed at the mean for the continuous variables and for a discrete
change from 0 to 1 for the dummy variables.
46 This may be a sign that overtime work is mostly supply-driven: the extent to which people are willing to work
extra hours, ﬁrms reduce the hiring rate. A possible explanation of why individuals should diﬀer in their willingness
to work extra hours is provided by Rosenthal and Strange (2002), according to whom in large markets people work
more in order to signal their ability in a rivalrous context (the ”urban rat race”).
47 These results are less surprising than those for men, which could possibly derive from the composition of the
non-working population (e.g., a higher incidence of men diﬃcult to employ, such as long-term unemployed, or people
with health problems).
19less intensively, probably because these categories of job seekers assign a higher value to non-search
activities than those who perceive themselves as unemployed. Interestingly, the position in the
household matters diﬀerently for the two sexes, as being a household head or a spouse increases the
probability of searching for men but decreases it for women (with respect to being an oﬀspring or
having other positions within the household). This diﬀerent behavior probably reﬂects the tendency
for wives and mothers to stay at home,48 and a greater need for non-employed husbands and fathers,
who are most often the primary earners in the household, to increase their search eﬀort. Finally,
the LLM job seeker density is positive and signiﬁcant only for men, implying that women do not
exercise more eﬀort when competition for vacant jobs raises, while men do.
5.3.2 Eﬀects of agglomeration
To examine the eﬀects of agglomeration on si and hi, I add the variables discussed in Section 4
to the baseline speciﬁcation. Table 6 summarizes the results on hazard rates and search intensity
for the econometric model correcting for sample selection ((10)).49 Thus, I ﬁrst consider the joint
eﬀect of the large city dummy, the industry localization variables and the proxy for family networks
(ﬁrst speciﬁcation).50 I then substitute the large city dummy with LLM population size (second
column). In the third and fourth columns I replicate the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations on the sub-sample
excluding the three largest LLMs.51
a) Hazard rates
Thus, after controlling for LLM job seekers’ density, which captures the negative congestion
externality exercised by unemployed workers on each other (see Petrongolo, 2001), I ﬁnd that
urban agglomeration has an overall positive eﬀect on the probability of ﬁnding a job, both when
48 Note that this may be due to child care, as Italy lacks of policies aimed at supporting mothers’ employment.
In order to test this hypothesis, I also ran the same regressions (not reported here) on the parent sub-sample,
controlling for the number of children below the age of six. I ﬁnd that a marginal increase in this variable lowers
women’s probability of searching by 1 percent (at 1 percent statistical signiﬁcance), but does not aﬀect men’s behavior.
This result supports the view that men and women have diﬀerent behavior because the traditional household division
implies that they face diﬀerent (opportunity) costs of search.
49 From now on I will not report the results for (9) – available upon request – because the Wald-test always rejects
the null hypothesis of no selection bias. In any case, the two models provide very similar outcomes on the sign and
statistical signiﬁcance of the agglomeration variables.
50 I also considered the eﬀect of each of these variables separately, with no diﬀerent results. Note that whether the
signs and the statistical signiﬁcance of the urbanization and localization dummies can correctly identify agglomeration
diﬀerentials in employment probabilities and search behavior clearly relies on LLMs to be separated markets (see, for
instance, Coles and Smith (1996) or Duranton and Monastiriotis, 2002), as discussed in Section 4.3.
51 The number of observations drops from 25,116 to 22,332 in the men’s sub-sample and from 46,131 to 40,885 in
the women’s case. The non-employed individuals residing in the excluded LLMs amount to 2,848 for Rome, 1,835
for Milan, and 3,530 for Naples.
20I measure it with the large city dummy and when I estimate it with LLM population size.52
Indeed, both variables are positive and signiﬁcant, in the women’s sub-sample at the 1 percent
level (speciﬁcations (6.5)–(6.6)). In the men’s sub-sample, the large city dummy is signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level, while population size has a p-value of 0.17 (speciﬁcations (6.1) and (6.2));
however, once I exclude the three largest LLMs from the sample the signiﬁcance level of population
raises to 7 percent (column (6.4)).53
For localization to create signiﬁcantly positive net externalities a minimum degree of ﬁrm thick-
ness is necessary. Indeed, searching in more industrially agglomerated areas raises men’s probability
of ﬁnding employment only above a certain threshold of manufacturing small-sized ﬁrm concentra-
tion. Thus, other things being equal, living in a super-district increases a man’s chance of ﬁnding
a job (columns (6.1) and (6.2)), while residing in an industrial district does not have any eﬀect.54
However, in contrast with the men’s case, the super-district variable is never signiﬁcant for women
(columns (6.5)–(6.6)).55 Further evidence on the existence of positive industry localization eﬀects
is given by the traditional-sector-specialization Pavitt index, proxying labor pooling. Contact rates
being equal, a better expected quality of matches should imply a higher hazard rate (since on the
one hand, job seekers might be choosier, but on the other hand ﬁrms make more attractive oﬀers,
which increases the worker’s acceptance probability). As Table 6 shows, the labor pooling proxy is
always positive and signiﬁcant for both men and women,56 supporting the hypothesis that industry
localization improves the quality of matches.57
Finally, in line with the priors, the proxy for quality of family networks has a positive eﬀect
on the chances of employment in all the speciﬁcations tested for men; though it does not aﬀect
52 This ﬁnding could be due to various factors: tighter markets (more intense job advertising or more vacancies),
urban wage premia, higher meeting rates, better quality of matches (see Section 2).
53 This result implies that in Rome, Milan and Naples men do not beneﬁt from agglomeration externalities, perhaps
because these cities are over-sized with respect to men’s employment possibilities.
54 Since the ID dummy is non-signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation and sample I tested, I do not report the results for
this variable (though they can be requested).
55 Possibly, this is because in Italy industry is more male-oriented than the tertiary sector.
56 However, this variable loses signiﬁcance in the restricted female sub-sample (speciﬁcations (6.7)-(6.8)), implying
that women’s match quality improves especially after the 2,400,000–inhabitant threshold.
57 Note that Petrongolo and Pissarides (2004) ﬁnd that in the UK agglomeration increases the quality of the match
(proxied by average wages) with no eﬀect on hazard rates, as reservation wages raise to fully compensate the higher
earnings (i.e., people become choosier and accept job oﬀers less frequently). However, in Italy agglomeration-driven
wage diﬀerentials are rather small in size: wage premia are just 2 − 3 percent large in big cities (Di Addario and
Patacchini (2005); against 33 percent in the US, according to Glaeser and Mare’, 2001) and non-existent in Industrial
Districts (de Blasio and Di Addario, 2005). It is thus conceivable that in agglomerated areas also reservation wage
diﬀerentials (on which, unfortunately, there are not reliable data) are not large enough to oﬀset any other positive
impacts on hazard rates.
21women’s likelihood of ﬁnding a job (columns (6.5)–(6.6)).58
b) Search intensity
I now turn to the eﬀects of agglomeration on men’s and women’s search behavior. The bottom
part of Table 6 shows the results.
In spite of the fact that urbanization improves the employment chances per unit of search, in
general job seekers do not search more intensively in big cities (columns (6.9), (6.10) and (6.13)).59
This may seem somewhat surprising, as job-seekers should increase their propensity to search when
their chances of ﬁnding a job rise. However, in terms of the model presented in Section 2 this
could be explained by the fact that in the most populated areas search cost increases oﬀset the
higher chances of employment. Indeed, the large commuting costs due to congestion (travelling on
crowded public transportation, spending time in traﬃc, etc.) may discourage people from searching
even though they have a higher probability of ﬁnding a job.60
Similarly, industry localization does not aﬀect men’s search behavior, in spite of the fact that it
raises their employment probabilities. Indeed, neither men nor women search any diﬀerently in the
more industrially agglomerated areas (columns (6.9)-(6.10) and (6.13)–(6.14)). Also the traditional
sector index is always non-signiﬁcant.
Finally, in accord with the results on hazard rates, the thicker family networks are the higher
the search eﬀort men exercise to look for a job, while women’s search is never aﬀected by the
number of employed individuals in the household.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I analyze agglomeration eﬀects on individual search intensity and hazard rates for
both Italian men and women. More speciﬁcally, I empirically examine whether population size,
small-sized manufacturing ﬁrm concentration, traditional sector specialization, and quality of family
networks generate overall net positive or negative externalities. In particular, while agglomeration
58 This could occur either because networking is a more male-oriented search channel, or because female networks
are of a lower quality. It is also possible that women living in families where more members work are choosier, as
they can beneﬁt from a higher income and thus presumably have a higher reservation wage (in contrast, men might
not ”aﬀord” to be choosey because of the diﬀerent role they have in the household). Furthermore, note that the
fact that the number of employed household members has an opposite eﬀect for men and women contrasts with the
hypothesis that this variables captures, rather than network quality, unobservable ability shared by the members of
the same family.
59 The only exception to this ﬁnding regards speciﬁcation (6.14).
60 Although in the model presented in Section 2 the causality runs only from search intensity to hazard rates (and
not viceversa), an alternative explanation of this ﬁnding could be that people do not need to exert a higher level of
search eﬀort to ﬁnd a job precisely because they have greater chances of employment.
22eﬀects are usually studied either at the urban or at the industry level, I am able, by using an
Istat algorithm that identiﬁes the more densely industrialized LLMs, to compare urbanization and
localization eﬀects.
Thus, I ﬁnd that both matching and search are sensitive to the type of agglomeration of the
local labor market. In general, urbanization increases the job seekers’ probability of ﬁnding a job
(per unit of search) independently of their gender, while industry localization raises only men’s
chances. Residing in a LLM highly specialized in traditional sectors, on the other hand, increases
hazard rates for both men and women, suggesting that labor pooling improves the eﬃciency of the
matching between jobs and workers. Finally, the size of family networks, proxied by the number of
employed members in the household, increases the probability of ﬁnding a job only for men.
As to search intensity, on average it is not aﬀected by either urbanization nor industrial ag-
glomeration. A possible explanation of why the intensity of search does not increase despite higher
hazard rates is that job seekers are discouraged from bearing the higher commuting costs produced
by the presence of a large population mass (i.e., travelling on congested public transportation,
spending time in traﬃc, etc.). Last, consistently with having higher chances of ﬁnding employ-
ment, the men who have larger family networks search more intensively, while women’s behavior is
not aﬀected by the thickness of networks.
While these ﬁndings hold on average, it is interesting to analyze whether they occur at any
level of agglomeration or only above certain threshold values. In this paper I show that results
are sensitive to the degree of agglomeration of the local labor market. In particular, industry
localization creates positive net economies only in super-districts (as opposed to industrial districts),
that is, in the subset of industrial clusters with the highest concentration of small and medium ﬁrms
in the manufacturing sector; for ”regular” districts, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect. Moreover, I ﬁnd
that mens’ employment chances raise with the degree of urbanization only up to the 1,500,000-
inhabitant threshold, possibly because Rome, Milan and Naples are too congested, while in these
cities the quality of women’s matches is higher than elsewhere.
Last, while it is well known that labor markets dynamics are gender-speciﬁc, it is less obvious
this is also the case for agglomeration externalities (even though this result is not new in the
literature: see, for instance, Rosenthal and Strange, 2002). A possible explanation can be found in
the behavioral diﬀerences between men and women due to the diﬀerent role they traditionally have
in the household, which makes them face diﬀerent opportunity costs of search. These diﬀerences
might be exacerbated by the lack of policies aimed at supporting mothers’ employment during child
23care.
24Table 1: Mobility attitudes
Acceptable job location by those unemployed
Own Daily commuting Anywhere Anywhere
municipality distance in Italy
41.3 38.8 14.9 5.0
Job location of those employed
Own Other municipality No ﬁxed Other province
municipality in same province place or abroad
55.2 30.7 6.9 7.1
Presence in the household at the time of interview
Present Absent for Absent for Absent for
less 1 year more 1 year more 1 year
and searching not searching
98.3 0.6 0.2 0.9
Source: authors’ elaboration on LFS data.
25Table 2: Average Transition Probabilities
Quarterly transition probabilities
Employedt+1 Unemployedt+1 Inactivet+1 Total
Men and Women
Employedt 96.9 0.9 2.2 100.0
Unemployedt 13.9 62.6 23.6 100.0
Inactivet 3.5 3.9 92.6 100.0
Population compositiont+1 54.6 5.7 39.7 100.0
Men
Employedt 97.5 0.9 1.6 100.0
Unemployedt 17.8 63.7 18.5 100.0
Inactivet 4.9 4.7 90.4 100.0
Population compositiont+1 68.2 5.3 26.5 100.0
Women
Employedt 95.9 1.0 3.2 100.0
Unemployedt 10.4 61.7 27.9 100.0
Inactivet 2.8 3.5 93.7 100.0
Population compositiont+1 41.5 6.1 52.9 100.0
Quarterly transition ﬂows
Employedt+1 Unemployedt+1 Inactivet+1 Population compositiont
Men and Women
Employedt 52.4 0.5 1.2 54.1
Unemployedt 0.8 3.7 1.4 5.8
Inactivet 1.4 1.6 37.1 40.0
Population compositiont+1 54.7 5.7 39.6 100.0
Men
Employedt 66.0 0.6 1.1 67.7
Unemployedt 1.1 3.4 1.0 5.4
Inactivet 1.3 1.3 24.3 26.9
Population compositiont+1 68.3 5.3 26.4 100.0
Women
Employedt 38.9 0.4 1.3 40.6
Unemployedt 0.7 3.9 1.8 6.3
Inactivet 1.5 1.8 49.8 53.1
Population compositiont+1 41.1 6.1 52.8 100.0
Source: elaboration on LFS (January-April 2002). Note: ﬂows are expressed in percentage of the working age population.
26Table 3: Descriptive statistics.
Employment Unemployment Job Activity Hazard into
rate rate seekers rate employment
Italy
Large city 54.7 10.2 17.0 60.9 24.7
Large city and super-district 63.3 3.7 8.0 65.7 29.5
Small town and super-district 64.6 3.0 11.0 66.6 56.9
Small town - other 54.6 9.8 17.1 60.6 32.5
Industrial district 63.3 3.5 10.5 65.7 51.2
North-West
Large city 61.9 5.3 11.5 65.4 36.6
Large city and super-district 63.3 3.7 8.0 65.7 29.5
Small town and super-district 63.9 2.1 6.4 65.2 60.8
Small town - other 62.7 4.3 10.7 65.5 47.5
Industrial district 63.1 3.5 8.9 65.4 48.2
North-East
Large city 62.2 3.3 8.7 64.3 55.5
Large city and super-district – – – – –
Small town and super-district 65.4 2.4 11.3 70.0 62.7
Small town - other 65.3 4.0 14.2 68.1 55.3
Industrial district 65.1 2.8 10.6 66.0 59.5
Center
Large city 59.1 7.3 15.8 63.8 19.3
Large city and super-district – – – – –
Small town and super-district 64.2 4.4 13.8 67.2 49.4
Small town - other 55.9 7.3 14.0 60.3 35.6
Industrial district 62.9 4.7 13.8 66.3 47.6
South
Large city 42.1 21.4 23.4 53.5 19.8
Large city and super-district – – – – –
Small town and super-district 62.5 2.5 13.4 64.1 70.3
Small town - other 45.1 17.5 21.1 54.7 24.8
Industrial district 53.4 5.6 10.5 56.6 38.8
Source: elaboration on the LFS, year 2002. Note that the only LLM that is both a large city and a super-district is that of Desio.
27Table 4: Baseline models for men
Hazard to employment Search intensity
Probit Heckprobit Probit Heckprobit
Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val.
LLM’s job seekers (log) -0.10 0.000 -0.09 0.000 0.02 0.374 0.01 0.383
LLM’s area (log) 0.05 0.154 0.03 0.378 -0.05 0.093 -0.04 0.096
LLM’s average extra hours worked 0.05 0.947 -0.14 0.841 -0.54 0.350 -0.54 0.339
LLM’s share of overtime workers in total workers -0.01 0.195 -0.01 0.131 -0.01 0.199 -0.01 0.189
LLM’s sector of specialization: high technology 0.15 0.078 0.14 0.078 -0.02 0.722 -0.02 0.749
LLM’s sector of specialization: specialization 0.21 0.200 0.19 0.246 -0.12 0.279 -0.12 0.267
LLM’s sector of specialization: scale intensive 0.33 0.044 0.29 0.081 -0.12 0.319 -0.12 0.321
LLM’s sector of specialization: traditional 0.73 0.023 0.68 0.031 -0.23 0.319 -0.22 0.344
Quarter I (seasonal dummy) 0.06 0.205 0.06 0.183 0.01 0.749 0.01 0.737
Quarter II (seasonal dummy) 0.07 0.165 0.07 0.166 0.07 0.013 0.07 0.014
North-East 0.17 0.088 0.16 0.106 0.12 0.052 0.12 0.053
Center 0.00 0.997 -0.01 0.921 -0.04 0.503 -0.04 0.449
South -0.18 0.059 -0.14 0.117 0.03 0.612 0.03 0.610
Age 0.01 0.304 0.05 0.000 0.09 0.000 0.09 0.000
Age squared 0.00 0.684 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000
University degree or higher -0.16 0.102 -0.11 0.196 0.23 0.001 0.24 0.001
High school -0.15 0.016 -0.16 0.006 0.04 0.296 0.04 0.292
Compulsory education -0.12 0.047 -0.14 0.016 -0.01 0.697 -0.01 0.770
Past work experiences 0.20 0.001 0.26 0.000 0.10 0.058 0.10 0.039
Search duration: less than 1 month 1.38 0.000 0.80 0.000 -1.02 0.000 -1.01 0.000
Search duration: 1-5 months 0.54 0.000 0.55 0.000 0.13 0.036 0.14 0.033
Search duration: 6-11 months 0.31 0.000 0.29 0.000 -0.05 0.500 -0.05 0.513
Single living alone 0.07 0.246 0.05 0.450
Household head 0.12 0.045 0.08 0.150
Spouse 0.39 0.001 0.35 0.003
Student -0.15 0.140 -0.25 0.009
Housewife -1.13 0.000 -1.12 0.000
Other inactive condition -1.34 0.000 -1.36 0.000
Number of non-working household members 0.01 0.411 0.01 0.271
Constant -1.63 0.001 -2.20 0.000 0.03 0.946 -0.02 0.956
Number of observations: 25,116 25,116
of which uncensored: 5,545
Source: author’s elaboration on LFS data. Note: White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering.
28Table 5: Baseline models for women
Hazard to employment Search intensity
Probit Heckprobit Probit Heckprobit
Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val.
LLM’s job seekers (log) -0.06 0.010 -0.05 0.014 0.00 0.918 0.00 0.912
LLM’s area (log) 0.07 0.095 0.06 0.102 0.01 0.714 0.01 0.730
LLM’s average extra hours worked -0.45 0.496 -0.45 0.481 0.05 0.920 0.05 0.913
LLM’s share of overtime workers in total workers 0.01 0.346 0.00 0.435 -0.01 0.138 -0.01 0.133
LLM’s sector of specialization: high technology 0.14 0.113 0.12 0.147 -0.06 0.337 -0.06 0.334
LLM’s sector of specialization: specialization 0.22 0.157 0.20 0.169 -0.05 0.573 -0.06 0.566
LLM’s sector of specialization: scale intensive 0.24 0.246 0.22 0.277 -0.09 0.418 -0.09 0.414
LLM’s sector of specialization: traditional 0.99 0.015 0.96 0.015 0.02 0.934 0.02 0.934
Quarter I (seasonal dummy) 0.03 0.536 0.03 0.486 0.04 0.194 0.04 0.180
Quarter II (seasonal dummy) 0.06 0.235 0.05 0.302 0.00 0.978 0.00 0.974
North-East 0.18 0.043 0.18 0.045 0.08 0.128 0.08 0.127
Center -0.08 0.287 -0.08 0.282 -0.06 0.206 -0.06 0.202
South -0.34 0.000 -0.33 0.000 -0.04 0.405 -0.04 0.405
Age -0.04 0.000 -0.03 0.015 0.06 0.000 0.06 0.000
Age squared 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.010 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000
University degree or higher 0.13 0.166 0.20 0.036 0.19 0.000 0.20 0.000
High school -0.03 0.719 -0.01 0.903 0.08 0.011 0.08 0.010
Compulsory education -0.09 0.239 -0.09 0.221 0.01 0.693 0.01 0.714
Past work experiences 0.23 0.000 0.29 0.000 0.13 0.000 0.13 0.000
Search duration: less than 1 month 1.36 0.000 0.95 0.000 -1.05 0.000 -1.06 0.000
Search duration: 1-5 months 0.60 0.000 0.60 0.000 0.15 0.013 0.15 0.014
Search duration: 6-11 months 0.51 0.000 0.51 0.000 0.07 0.208 0.07 0.213
Single living alone -0.09 0.211 -0.09 0.204
Household head -0.15 0.003 -0.14 0.005
Spouse -0.30 0.000 -0.30 0.000
Student -1.05 0.000 -1.04 0.000
Housewife -1.27 0.000 -1.27 0.000
Other inactive condition -0.97 0.000 -0.99 0.000
Number of non-working household members 0.02 0.071 0.02 0.064
Constant -1.88 0.000 -2.09 0.000 -0.06 0.848 -0.04 0.895
Number of observations: 46,131 46,131
of which uncensored: 5,731
Source: author’s elaboration on LFS data. Note: White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering.
29Table 6: Hazard to employment and search intensity (bivariate probit with sample
selection)
Hazard to employment: men
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3)(*) (6.4)(*)
Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val.
LLM’s job seekers (log) -0.122 0.000 -0.116 0.000 -0.123 0.000 -0.127 0.000
LLM’s area (log) 0.026 0.435 0.036 0.278 0.020 0.551 0.023 0.481
LLM’s population 0.036 0.179 0.219 0.069
Large city dummy 0.165 0.063 0.192 0.041
Super-district dummy 0.192 0.061 0.202 0.056 0.192 0.062 0.198 0.061
Employed family members 0.051 0.026 0.051 0.026 0.045 0.069 0.046 0.062
Labor pooling 0.714 0.033 0.782 0.009 1.467 0.003 1.327 0.003
Hazard to employment: women
(6.5) (6.6) (6.7)(*) (6.8)(*)
Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val.
LLM’s job seekers (log) -0.100 0.000 -0.102 0.001 -0.111 0.000 -0.130 0.000
LLM’s area (log) 0.054 0.165 0.075 0.053 0.063 0.119 0.066 0.096
LLM’s population 0.144 0.004 0.352 0.000
Large city dummy 0.248 0.004 0.232 0.007
Super-district dummy 0.099 0.281 0.094 0.312 0.095 0.299 0.091 0.324
Employed family members 0.030 0.303 0.031 0.279 0.033 0.280 0.033 0.273
Labor pooling 0.951 0.021 1.283 0.004 1.092 0.192 1.064 0.192
Search intensity: men
(6.9) (6.10) (6.11)(*) (6.12)(*)
Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val.
LLM’s job seekers (log) 0.020 0.328 0.003 0.884 0.008 0.709 0.018 0.454
LLM’s area (log) -0.043 0.118 -0.043 0.107 -0.033 0.211 -0.032 0.233
LLM’s population 0.035 0.386 -0.112 0.207
Large city dummy -0.026 0.689 -0.050 0.425
Super-district dummy 0.030 0.560 0.030 0.566 0.028 0.583 0.029 0.569
Employed family members 0.039 0.017 0.038 0.019 0.034 0.060 0.033 0.061
Labor pooling -0.248 0.286 -0.156 0.533 -0.418 0.308 -0.419 0.315
Search intensity: women
(6.13) (6.14) (6.15)(*) (6.16)(*)
Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val. Coeﬀ. P-val.
LLM’s job seekers (log) 0.000 0.986 -0.023 0.166 -0.012 0.466 -0.017 0.414
LLM’s area (log) 0.008 0.731 0.010 0.655 0.017 0.472 0.015 0.531
LLM’s population 0.063 0.030 0.004 0.972
Large city dummy -0.007 0.896 -0.024 0.668
Super-district dummy -0.009 0.880 -0.010 0.863 -0.010 0.857 -0.010 0.857
Employed family members -0.006 0.678 -0.007 0.632 -0.004 0.786 -0.004 0.775
Labor pooling 0.024 0.921 0.182 0.415 -0.017 0.967 -0.002 0.996
Source: author’s elaboration on LFS data. Note: White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering.
(*) Computed on the sub-sample excluding the three largest LLMs (i.e., Rome, Milan, and Naples).
30Appendix 1
I reconstructed the LFS longitudinal data with the deterministic method. The loss of observations
implied by this method can be due to reporting errors in the household identiﬁer or in the other
individual variables (typically, the date of birth), but it can be also due to genuine ”attrition”: this is
the loss of information deriving from the non-availability of some of the people to be re-interviewed
at time t + 1. In what follows I use the term ”attrition” for both types of losses.
If the information loss was correlated to working condition changes, attrition would be a poten-
tial source of bias for the estimation of labor market dynamics. This typically occurs when people
change residence because they ﬁnd employment in a diﬀerent location, in which case the exit from
the LFS sample is determined by a movement towards employment.
In order to test for the eﬀects of attrition in the estimation of labor market dynamics, I follow
the approach proposed by Jim´ enez-Mart´ ın and Peracchi (2003), looking at individuals’ survey
participation at time t, t + 1 and t + 4 (i.e., respectively, one quarter and one year after the ﬁrst
LFS interview). As Jim´ enez-Mart´ ın and Peracchi (2003), I identify two sets of individuals: (1) those
participating at all the three surveys (full-time respondents); and (2) those participating at time t
and t + 1 but not at time t + 4 (non full-time respondents). More formally, let D be an indicator
equal to 1 if the person is a full-time respondent and to 0 elsewhere. Non-working individuals at
time t can be either unemployed (U) or out of the labor force (O). At time t+1 they can be either
employed (E), or unemployed (U) or out of the labor force (O). Let πD
ij be the probability of moving
from state i = U,O at time t to state j = E,U,O at time t + 1, for an individual whose sample




for i = U,O, j = E,U,O.
Consider the statistic lij = π0
ij −π1
ij. If attrition was not a source of bias for transition probabil-
ities, under the null hypothesis lij would be equal to zero. In other words, if full time respondents
and people who are subject to attrition have the same probability to move towards all the other
labor market states then I can assume that attrition does not aﬀect transition probabilities.
Critical values for lij can be easily derived. Because of the central limit theorem, lij divided
by its standard error has a t-Student’s distribution. Rejection at 95 percent signiﬁcance level,
for instance, occurs for values of lij greater than 2 in absolute value. Table 6 reports the test
statistics by gender, age group (15-34 and 35+) and area of residence (North–West, North–East,
31Center, South). As the table shows, the test results conﬁrm the adequacy of the adopted matching
procedure in my study of labor market movements, for all the socio-demographic groups considered.
Table A1. Testing for the eﬀect of attrition
Men Women
Age Age Age Age
15–34 35–64 15–34 35–64
North West
lUE 0.33 -0.10 0.35 0.13
lUU -0.44 -0.25 0.31 -0.27
lUO 0.07 -0.05 -0.20 -0.28
lOE 0.09 0.02 -0.04 0.00
lOU -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.01
lOO 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.35
North East
lUE -0.39 0.21 -0.91 -0.04
lUU -0.46 -1.05 0.02 -0.43
lUO 0.57 0.23 0.03 -0.21
lOE 0.15 0.05 -0.07 -0.02
lOU -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.04
lOO -1.31 0.12 -0.95 -0.19
Centre
lUE 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.00
lUU -0.10 -0.54 -0.11 0.03
lUO -0.10 0.65 0.12 -0.44
lOE -0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.04
lOU 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02
lOO -0.73 0.34 -1.00 -0.66
South
lUE -0.06 0.22 -0.09 -0.06
lUU -0.91 -2.03 -1.14 -0.34
lUO -0.18 0.00 -0.11 -0.24
lOE -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
lOU -0.29 0.01 -0.20 0.00
lOO -0.80 0.08 -1.55 -1.38
Source: authors’ elaboration on LFS data.
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